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GERMAN WORKS COUNCILS AND THE ANATOMY OF WAGES
Abstract
This paper provides the first comprehensive examination of the effect of German works
councils on wages, using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB for
2001. We find that works councils are associated with higher earnings: the wage
premium is around 11 percent, and is higher under formal collective bargaining. This
result persists after taking account of worker and establishment heterogeneity and the
endogeneity of works council presence. Using quantile regressions, we further report that
the works council premium is decreasing in the position of the worker in the wage
distribution; and is higher for women than for men. Finally, the works council wage
premium is associated with longer job tenure, which suggests that some of the premium
is a noncompetitive rent. That said, it remains entirely possible that works council ‘voice’
may dominate its distributive effects, at least insofar as the tenure result is concerned.
JEL Classification: J31, J50.
Keywords: matched employer-employee data, rent seeking, tenure, wages, wage distribution,
works councils, collective bargaining.2
I.  Introduction
The  effects  of  German  works  councils  on  most  aspects  of  firm  performance  –
profitability, labor productivity, and employment growth (and, more recently, investment
in tangible capital) – have been increasingly scrutinized since the late 1980s. (For a
review  of  the  developing  literature,  see  Addison  et  al.,  2004b;  and,  for  some
contemporary  investment  results,  see  Addison  et  al.,  2007).  Altogether  less  well
investigated have been their effects on wages. This seems odd because analysts reporting
adverse effects on other outcomes have tended to rely on rent-seeking behavior, and not
just heightened bureaucratization, by way of explanation. On closer inspection, however,
the  source  of  the  comparative  neglect  of  wage  determination  is  data  limitations.
Typically, plant-level data sets only contain information on average wages, derived from
data on the total wage bill and employment. A proper ceteris paribus earnings analysis
requires the estimation of an augmented Mincerian function on the basis of individual
data, without which direct investigation of rent seeking is hamstrung. (Arguably, some
research may even have been deflected by the terms of the German legislation – the
Works Constitution Act – that formally foreclose wage bargaining by the works council
unless this is expressly provided for under the relevant sectoral wage agreement.)
With the recent availability of linked employer-employee datasets we can do
much more. Not only can we look at works council effects on wages holding constant
human capital, demographic, and other individual (and plant) characteristics, we can also
inspect the entire wage distribution. This focus is appropriate because it might be argued
that works councils seek equal pay and reduced earnings dispersion as an insurance
strategy, reflecting the preferences of risk-averse employees (Horn and Svensson, 1986).
Further, an earnings function approach in conjunction with information on tenure permits
investigation of explanations other than rent seeking for wage premia attaching to plants
with works councils.
In  the  present  paper,  we  will  deploy  one  such  data  set,  the  nationally
representative linked employer-employee data set of the IAB, which combines the
employment  statistics  register  of  the  German  Federal  Employment  Agency
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) with plant-level data from the Institute for Employment
Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, or IAB) Establishment Panel.
The resulting linked data set is known as the LIAB. It is described in section IV and is
prefaced in section III by a statement of our empirical model. Section V then contains our
detailed findings organized along the dimensions of wages, the wage structure, and job
tenure. All of this is preceded, however, by brief consideration of the institutional
background and a review of the sparse existing literature on works councils and wages.3
II.  The Institutional Setting
Works Councils, Collective Bargaining and the Dual System
Collective bargaining in Germany is formally based on trade unions and employers’
associations. With the exception of some firms that conclude their own agreements with
unions, collective bargaining over wages and conditions (job classifications, working
time,  and  working  conditions)  is  conducted  outside  the  plant,  typically  at
industry/regional level.
1 Decisions on strikes and lockouts are similarly detached from the
plant level. Works councils, on the other hand, focus on production issues, handle
individual grievances, and are charged with the implementation of collective agreements
at  the  plant  level.  They  are  excluded  from  negotiating  plant  agreements
(Betriebsvereinbarungen) with local management on matters that are covered, or usually
covered, by collective agreements unless expressly authorized to do so under the relevant
sectoral  agreement  (under  section  77(3)  of  the  Works  Constitution  Act).
2  Even
abstracting from the subtle complication introduced by firms that are not parties to a
sectoral  collective  wage  agreement  (or  Flächentarifvertag), works councils have
nonetheless typically been involved in wage setting for two main reasons. First, their
extensive codetermination rights (noted below) convey power that can be exercised
informally. Secondly, wage drift has long characterized wage determination in German
manufacturing. One-size-fits-all collective agreements necessarily do not allow for
individual needs (historically, those of the high fliers) and they have been accompanied
by the lubricant of wage drift. Works councils have therefore actively participated in the
fixing of wages above Tarif levels and the provision of special bonuses and allowances.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that collective bargaining agreements have always been
accorded a higher status than workplace agreements.
The functions of works councils are fixed under law. According to the Works
Constitution Act, works councils may be set up in all establishments with at least five
permanent employees following a petition by a small group of workers or by a trade
union represented at the establishment. While mandated, then, works councils are not
automatic. Works councilors are elected in secret ballot for a 4-year term, and they
represent all workers not just union members. Although works councils are formally
independent of unions, as a practical matter ties between the two agencies are close, with
three out of five works councilors being union members. Traditionally, they have assisted
in union recruitment at the place of work. Because of this function they have been
referred to as “pillars of union security” (Müller-Jentsch, 1995, p. 610).4
 The law provides the works council with far-reaching rights of information and
consultation – in areas such as manpower planning, changes in work processes, the
working environment, and job content – together with an explicit set of codetermination
or  joint-management  rights  on  so-called  “social  matters.”  The  latter  include  the
commencement and termination of working hours, principles of remuneration, pay
arrangements including the fixing of job and bonus rates, the regulation of overtime and
reduced working hours, holiday arrangements, and health and safety matters. The works
council also enjoys ‘consent rights’ in matters of hiring and firing as well as job
classification (the placement of workers in certain wage groups). Further, works council
authority – as indexed by formal competence and size (including the number of full-time
councilors) – is increasing in establishment size.
Over time the competence or authority of the works council has increased. The
first Works Constitution Act in 1952, which still forms much of the basis of the
information, consultation, and codetermination right of the works council, emphasized
the independence of the works council and recognized only limited rights for unions in
the plant. Works councils were also prohibited from striking, as indeed they still are. The
second  Works  Constitution  Act  in  1972  materially  extended  the  information  and
consultation rights of the works council in respect of management decisions involving
changes  in  capacity,  working  operations,  and  production  processes,  as  well  as
strengthening codetermination rights by allowing for adjudication in the event of an
impasse. It also improved the access of unions to the workplace and permitted them to
submit  lists  of  candidates  in  works  council  elections,  as  well  as  allowing  works
councilors  to  hold  union  office.  The  most  recent  legislation  –  the  2001 Works
Constitution Reform Act – sought to stimulate works council formation, to strengthen
existing works councils (e.g. by increasing the number of full-time works councilors),
and to improve the operation of the works council apparatus. In the latter exercise, cost
was said to be secondary to democracy at the workplace (for details, see Addison et al.,
2004a). That said, acceptance by management of the entity seems to have grown. The
reason is that, while typically cut from the union cloth, works councilors are often seen as
more pragmatic and flexible than unions.
Works Councils and Wages
As noted earlier, there is comparatively little information on the effect of works councils
on wages. The literature on the impact of collective bargaining proper on wages is also
sparse (see below). As far as works council impact is concerned, the early literature
comes to different conclusions. Thus, in their analysis of 60 firms in the metal working5
industry, using pooled data for 1977 and 1979, FitzRoy and Kraft (1985) fail to detect
any positive effect of works councils on wages.
3  Rather, the authors attribute the adverse
effect of works councils on their performance measure – specifically, firm profitability –
to slower decision making rather than to rent seeking.  By contrast, in an analysis of 50
industrial  firms  in  1990/91,  Addison  et  al.  (1993)  obtain  a  significantly  positive
coefficient estimate for a works council dummy variable in their OLS and least median of
squares/reweighted least squares wage regressions (see also Meyer, 1995a).
More recent studies using larger datasets also present a mixed picture. In an
analysis of the first wave of the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel, covering manufacturing
establishments in Lower Saxony, Addison et al. (2001) report in OLS wage regressions
that wages are approximately 15 to 18.5 percent higher in works council regimes. The
authors also investigate the gap between the wage fixed at industry/regional level and that
paid at the establishment, using management-reported estimates of the percentage wage
gap  (übertarifliche Entlohnung).
4  The  authors’  Tobit  estimates  fail  to  indicate  any
influence of works councils on the wage gap for either blue-collar or white-collar
employees. However, in exploiting a question in the panel inquiring of managers whether
or not the works council was jointly involved in determining the wage gap, Addison et al.
(1997) report that the gap is higher where the works council is involved in wage
determination.
5
The most recent study to investigate works council wage effects also uses (two
waves of) the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel. Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) offer a test of the
Freeman-Lazear (1995) model that, where a council coexists/is embedded in a collective
bargaining agreement, councils and local management are likely to maximize the joint
surplus. In contrast, where there is no collective agreement (external to the firm) there is
said to be little to constrain rent-seeking councils.
6 Interestingly, Hübler and Jirjahn
report no evidence of an independent effect of collective bargaining on wages, which
they justify on the grounds that the outcome of collective agreements is usually extended
to the overwhelming number of employees in an industry (but see Kohaut and Schnabel,
2003, and Addison et al., 2006, for a discussion of the erosion of collective bargaining
coverage).
7 For their part, works councils are found to have a positive effect on wages,
which outcome is more evident for the uncovered sample. (They are also associated with
a well-defined positive effect on productivity in the covered sector.) Somewhat consistent
with Hübler and Jirjahn, a recent study by Gürtzgen (2006), using IAB longitudinal data,
reports that rent sharing is unrelated to collective bargaining coverage once one accounts
for unobserved plant heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents. Unlike these authors,
however, she argues that unions favor a compressed intra-industry wage structure and6
suppress  the  responsiveness  of  wages  to  firm-specific profitability considerations.
Contrary to Hübler and Jirjahn, Gürtzgen further reports that her well-determined positive
association between works councils and rent sharing found in pooled OLS estimates does
not survive the application of dynamic panel estimates.
 The remaining studies that examine the link between collective bargaining proper
and wages do not control for works council presence. Using the same dataset as that
employed in the present paper, albeit for 1996 rather than 2001, Kölling et al. (2005) find
that, unlike Hübler and Jirjahn, collective bargaining at sectoral level raises wages, at
least for the least-skilled workers. Another study by Stephan and Gerlach (2005), again
using linked employer-employee data – but this time for Lower Saxony – for the years
1990, 1995, and 2001 reports evidence of a rising wage premium over time for the
average covered worker. Specifically, the wage gain for working under an industry-level
collective bargaining agreement increased from 4 percent in 1991, through 9 percent in
1995, to 12 percent in 2001.
As we see it, the suggestions derived from the empirical literature are as follows.
First, and most important, works councils may indeed influence wages, despite section 77
(3) of the Constitution Act. But the manner of that influence can be subtle; in particular,
the effect may vary along the skills continuum and the wage distribution. Further, in
circumstances where that effect hinges on management being willing or choosing to
discuss supplementary payments, the premium may reflect the payment of efficiency
wages. Second, albeit more controversially, collective bargaining proper may be expected
to influence wages in Germany no less than in other nations. The main qualification here
has to do with the union-works council nexus.
III.  Methodology
Earnings regressions
Our starting point is the standard Mincerian earnings function in which the (log) wage of
individual i, yi, is a function of (observed) productive characteristics, X1i, to include both
general and specific skills (proxied by schooling, tenure, and occupation), and control
variables specific to establishment j, Zj.  In particular, we are interested in the specific
role of the works council institution, Fj.  We thus specify the model
i j j i i e F B Z B X y + + + = δ 1 1 .                     (1)
It is natural to assume that this model suffers from heterogeneity bias (or omitted
variable bias), in the sense that not all relevant individual (productive) characteristics are
observed (or collected by the researcher). If unobserved individual  heterogeneity is7
assumed to be correlated with the observed characteristics, then it is straightforward to
show that the (OLS) coefficients estimates of model (1) will be biased.
8 One way to
control for heterogeneity bias is to assume that workers in the same workplace share
some common  (unobserved) characteristics. Adding establishment-average coworker
characteristics X2j to equation (1) may therefore enable us to control for a key source of
contamination. Accordingly, we have
               i j j j i i u F B Z B X B X y + + + + = δ 2 2 1 1 .                                            (2)
.
Finally, to control for the possibility of an establishment ‘self-selecting’ into
works council status, we add to the model the predicted propensity score – that is, the
estimated probability of a given establishment having a works council, j p ˆ , giving
i j j j j i i p F B Z B X B X y ε λ δ + + + + + = ˆ 2 2 1 1 .  (3)
By construction, X2j allows us to get rid of the correlation between unobserved worker
ability and works council status, while  j p ˆ  controls for the potential  endogeneity of the
works council dummy in the wage equation. By reason of the inclusion of  X2j and  j p ˆ  in
equation (3), δ  is not expected to be correlated either with unobserved worker ability or
with unobserved establishment-specific characteristics. (Familiarly, the introduction of
j p ˆ  is valid under the assumption that the unobserved wage determinants are not
correlated with works council status.)
Model (3) will be estimated for all workers and for males and females separately,
using both OLS  and quantile regression methods. This allows us to inquire into the
anatomy of the works council wage mark-up for different groups of employees. In this
context, we will also exploit the interaction between works councils and selected
variables (namely, gender, schooling, and collective bargaining coverage). In this case,
and now omitting the other covariates for convenience, the corresponding empirical
model can be formulated as
i i j j i j i S F F S F a y ε λ δ λ + + + − + = 1 0 0 ) 1 ( ,  (4)
where S denotes the set of selected variables that interact with the works council dummy,
F.
Job Tenure
As hypothesized earlier, the payment of higher wages in works council establishments
may reflect either the ability of works councils to extract a bigger slice of the pie8
(surplus) or the ability of firms to extract greater effort from workers (for example, via
the payment of efficiency wages). In the former case, workers are paid above ‘normal’
wages and we should observe, all else constant, higher tenure, Ti. In the latter case,
establishments pay a compensating differential so that no correlation between tenure and
works council status should be expected.
To test these conflicting hypotheses, we first specify the following base model
i j j j i i e F B Z B X B X T + + + + = δ 2 2 1 1 .                                  (5)
As in the case of wages earlier, the parameter estimates – in particular, the coefficient δ
– may be biased. In order to capture the true impact of works councils on tenure, we will
adopt the strategy followed by Card and de la Rica (2006) in this Review. Specifically, in
a first step, we look at the wage profile of workers unaffected by works council activity
by  estimating  equation  (2)  for  the  sample  of  workers  in  non-works  council
establishments. We next interact the predicted (log) wage, i y ˆ, with the works council
variable Fj, giving
1122ˆ*iijjjijiTXBXBZBFyFeδγ=+++++
.                                  (6)
The parameter 
γ
 will then give the impact of works councils on tenure after controlling
for the average (non-works council) effect of wages on tenure.
This modeling strategy is explicitly designed to test whether, cet. par., employees
in establishments controlled by a works council tend to have higher tenure than their non-
works council counterparts. Assuming that wages increase tenure – and ignoring for now
the possibility of reverse causation (or simultaneity) – one should indeed expect the
causal effect of wages to differ across plants if the two types of establishment attract
substantially different types of workers, irrespective of whether the works council
differential is increasing or decreasing over the wage distribution. But where the wage
gap is declining, there is the risk of not observing any statistically significant association
between higher (predicted) wages and greater tenure, not because the institution is
irrelevant but because its effect may be too small.
In these circumstances, it seems worthwhile to test whether the effect of works
councils varies across the distribution of tenure; that is to say, whether individuals with
longer tenure are indeed those who benefit most from works councils. We implement this
inquiry by running a quantile regression on model (6) to check whether the parameter 
γ
is increasing across quantiles, with an increasing 
γ
 being taken as evidence in favor of
works council involvement in rent-seeking.9
A final issue is connected with the hypothesis that works councils may generate
both improved decision-making – and hence higher surplus – and ‘monopoly’ wages (i.e.
higher wages than the ‘competitive,’ non-works council level). In this case, longer tenure
might reflect the fact that higher wages are generated by heightened worker involvement
in decision-making, not to be found in establishments without works councils. This is the
notion of collective voice. If the amount of participation sought by workers is not too
high, worker participation can indeed be optimally chosen by a profit maximizing firm
given appropriate institutional constraints (e.g. Lazear, 1995). Now, both higher wages
and higher tenure attend the works council institution. In these circumstances, model (6)
may be ill-suited to differentiating rent-seeking from the efficiency argument.
One means of further examining this issue is to run a standard Freeman-Medoff
(1984) model in which (log) tenure is regressed on works council status and (log) wages
together with the usual set of controls. The works council dummy and log wages will
now proxy ‘voice’ and ‘monopoly’ effects, respectively. Formally, this model can be
formulated as
i i i j i e P y F a T + + + + = λ δ δ 1 ln ,       (7)
where P composites all relevant individual and establishment-level explanatory variables
and yi denotes the (log) wage.
9
Arguably, an alternative procedure might be to run a modified version of model
(7) in which tenure is regressed on a works council dummy and expected wages  i y ˆ
(rather than on observed wages  i y ), and then compare the results with the Card and de la
Rica (2006) specification in model (6), above. In this case, the works council coefficient
would  give  the  effect  of  the  works  council  on  tenure  either  through  higher  than
competitive wages or higher efficiency. Unfortunately, the Card and de la Rica model
cannot  estimate  the  ‘main’  effect  of  the  predicted  wage, i y ˆ, on tenure since by
construction the set of regressors in the predicted wage equation is the same as the set of
control variables in the tenure equation.10
IV.  Data
Our data are taken from the 2001 wave of the LIAB. As noted above, the LIAB combines
Federal Employment Agency employment statistics with plant-level data from the IAB
Establishment  Panel.  The  distinctive  feature  of  the  LIAB  is  the  combination  of
information on individuals and details concerning the establishments that employ them.
The employment statistics are drawn from the German employment register,
which contains information on more than 98 percent of the employees and trainees
included  in  the  establishment  panel  (Alda,  2005).  The  employment  register  was
established in 1973 to integrate the notification procedures for social security (pensions,
health insurance, and unemployment insurance). Information is recorded at the start and
end of the individual’s employment spell within a firm and in annual end-year reports.
The employment statistics contain data on the individual’s three-digit occupation, daily
gross wage up to the earnings ceiling for social security contributions,
 gender, year of
birth, nationality, marital status, number of children, and schooling/training. Each
individual record also contains the establishment identifier, as well as the size and
industry affiliation of that establishment.
To take account of the top coding of earnings found for roughly 11 percent of the
sample, we imputed wages for those employees at the censored level. To this end, we
first created 20 cells differentiated by gender, education (the six schooling groups
identified in Appendix Table 1) and nationality (German versus non-German), and ran
censored wage regressions for each. The covariates comprised tenure, tenure squared,
age, and binary variables for sector, location (western/eastern Germany), and skill. (Our
procedure recognizes that the level at which wages are top coded differs between eastern
and western Germany.) Predicted wages for each censored observation were then
calculated and assigned for each individual.
For the purposes of the present inquiry it was also necessary to have data on
length of tenure. However, and similar to the information on wages, the tenure data are
also censored. In the case of western Germany some 9 percent of employees have their
tenure censored (at 25 years of tenure), while for eastern Germany 35 percent of the
sample have censored tenure data (at 10 years of tenure). Since most of the censored
individuals are employed in works council establishments, dropping them may be
expected to materially bias the results. For this reason, we decided to impute tenure using
the same procedure as described above for wages.
The plant-level component of the LIAB, the IAB Establishment Panel, was
initiated in 1993 (Kölling, 2000). It is based on a stratified random sample – strata for 16
industries and 10 employment size classes – from the population of all establishments11
employing at least one employee paying social security contributions. Although larger
plants are over-sampled, within each cell the sampling is random. In 2001 the sample
comprised 14,878 plants and some 2.5 million employees.
The IAB Establishment Panel was created to meet the needs of the Federal
Employment Agency for improved information on the demand side of the labor market.
Accordingly, information on the workforce and its decomposition and development
through time are central elements of the Panel questionnaire. Further questions concern
the establishment’s sales, exports, investment expenditures, age, and corporate form/legal
status. Yet others include the size of the overall wage bill, training provision, hours
worked, technical status of equipment, overtime payments, and collective bargaining
status. Most such questions are asked annually.
In summary, the LIAB is created by linking the employment statistics of the
Federal Employment Agency with the IAB Establishment Panel via the plant identifier
available in both data sets. The information on length of tenure, in particular, first became
available in the 2001 wave. This is an important reason to use this wave of the LIAB.
Moreover, since some key establishment variables pertaining to 2001 are only available
in the 2002 IAB Establishment Panel, we merged this information with the 2002 wave.
Our selected establishments are thus required to be in both waves. Sectoral coverage
includes manufacturing and services, and excludes not-for-profit organizations. In
addition, only full-time individuals aged between 19 and 65 years are included in the
sample (apprentices were excised). Finally, in order to include only establishments where
in principle works councils can be present, we dropped all workers in establishments with
less than five employees. Matching the selected employees to the selected establishments
resulted  in  an  estimation/regression  sample  of  1,344,656  workers  across  8,579
establishments.
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we also ran the same
estimations for establishments with 21 to 100 employees. There are two reasons to
choose plants within this size interval: in the first place, the powers of their councils are
to all intents and purposes fixed (otherwise, they are increasing in establishment size);
and, in the second place, only a tiny minority of smaller plants with less than 21
employees have works councils while the large preponderance of establishments with
more than 100 employees have them (Addison and Teixeira, 2006). For our sample of
establishments with 21 to 100 employees, roughly 38 percent of establishments and 45
percent of employees are covered by works councils.   
V. Findings12
Summary data on worker (mean) characteristics for the entire sample and also by gender
and works council status are given in Table 1. Clearly, workers in works council
establishments have higher wages than their non-works council counterparts (with log
daily wages of 4.591 and 4.131, respectively) and males also earn more than females (log
wages of 4.609 and 4.369, respectively).
10 The standard deviation of log wages is also
higher in non-works council than in works council establishments at 0.373 and 0.477,
respectively. In turn, job tenure is longer in establishments with works councils than in
establishments without works councils: 10.017 versus 5.224 years. White-collar workers
are more prevalent in works council establishments, while conversely low skilled blue-
collar workers outnumber those in non-works council workplaces by an 11 percentage
point margin.
11 Overall, the proportion of workers in the two lowest skill categories, if not
educational categories, is also higher in establishments without works councils. Not
surprisingly perhaps, collective bargaining coverage is almost universal (94 percent) for
workers in works council establishments and much lower in the case of plants without
them (42 percent). But differences in collective agreement coverage by gender are
minimal, and the same is true for gender differences in schooling. In sum, the observed
worker characteristics in our sample are reminiscent of those reported in the union-wage
literature: like union workers, employees in works council establishments have higher
wages, higher skills, higher tenure, and lower wage dispersion.
(Table 1 near here)
Corresponding establishment means are presented in Appendix Table 2. Observe
that there are fewer works council establishments than non-works council establishments,
the latter outnumbering the former by a twelve percentage point margin. Disparities with
respect to the means reported in Table 1 reflect the fact that bigger establishments
(namely, those with 250 or more workers) have almost complete works council coverage.
Wages are 42.3 percent higher in works council establishments and tenure is 2.8 years
longer.  Collective  bargaining  coverage  is  also  much  higher  in  works  council
establishments. Finally, establishment-level data point to lower tenure on average among
women than men, while overtime supplements are also much more frequent among men.
These two aspects may be expected to contribute to the observed wage gender gap of a
little over 20 percent in favor of men, observed at both individual and establishment
level.
(Table 2 near here)
Table 2 presents the OLS wage regressions with different sets of regressors
according to equations (1) through (3).  The first column of the table confirms the 0.46
(log) wage differential in favor of works councils earlier reported in Table 1. This13
premium falls dramatically (by around three-quarters) once establishment and individual
employee characteristics are added to the specification. This means that a large share of
the  wage  gap  can  be  explained  by  systematic  sorting  of  firms  and  employees.
Specifically, after adding worker characteristics the works council wage differential is
around 14.1 percent (column 2) and this falls to 11.7 percent (column 3) with the further
addition of plant characteristics and the proxies for differences between workers (the
average co-worker variables). The covariates have the expected signs (see, for example,
Card and de la Rica, 2006). That is, wages increase with age, tenure, qualifications, and
professional status. They are lower for women and foreigners. Further, wages are higher
in larger establishments, in establishments applying collective wage agreements, as well
as in establishments reporting high profits and paying overtime supplements.
There is little indication that self-selection into works council status accounts for
much of this (reduced) wage premium. The propensity score coefficient is statistically
significant but, comparing columns (3) and (4), it can be seen that there is only a trivial
increase in the differential – from 11.7 to 12.1 percent – with the addition of this
argument. The propensity that a works councils is present is calculated using the standard
covariates (see Addison et al., 1997): establishment size and establishment size squared,
the  share  of  blue-collar,  temporary  workers,  female,  and  part-time  employees,
establishment age (dummy), collective bargaining (at establishment and sector level),
payment above levels set under collective bargaining, the profit situation (dummy),
location (in eastern versus western Germany), and 16 sector dummies – the Probit
regression, not reported here but available from the authors on request, is well defined
with a pseudo-R
2 of 0.37, and all covariates (other than payment above the collective
bargaining level) are statistically significant at conventional levels and of the expected
sign.
The premium associated with collective bargaining coverage (at either sectoral or
establishment level) is around 6 percent. This is one-half the value reported by Stephan
and Gerlach (2005, p. 2301) in their study of Lower Saxony for 2001, but taken together
the two sets of findings using matched employer-employee data help dispel the illusion
that extension of coverage implies the absence of a union premium.
(Table 3 near here)
Turning to the separate results by gender in Table 3, we obtain the interesting
ceteris paribus result that the presence of a works council benefits female workers in
particular. Since women have lower wages on average, this finding implies that the
institution attenuates the gender differential in Germany. This attenuation is also reported
by Gartner and Stephan (2004), using the decomposition suggested by Juhn et al. (1993).14
As shown in Appendix Table 3, column (1), we obtain the same result if we pool the two
sub-samples (of men and women workers) and interact the works council argument with
a female dummy variable. It is estimated in this case that the wage gender gap in works
council establishments decreases by 10.3 percent.
(Table 4 near here)
The presence of a gender gap is also confirmed in Table 4, which focuses on
schooling level. It can be seen that the wage premium associated with works council
presence is broadly though not monotonically decreasing in the skill (or schooling) level,
namely, from around 11.9 percent for the least skilled (secondary education without a
professional qualification) to 9.1 percent for workers with a university degree. So there is
some indication that works councils play a role in wage compression, narrowing to some
degree the wage gap between high- and low-schooling individuals and the gender wage
gap. That said, this picture is less evident when we interact the works council dummy
with the education dummies (see Appendix Table 3).
(Table 5 near here)
Table 5 gives some results from fitting quantile regressions to our earnings data
for all workers and separately by gender. The table provides results for the 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,
and 0.8 quantiles. We see that the wage premium for being covered by a works council is
significantly declining in earnings for the entire sample and also for men and for
women.
12 For females, the premium for the 0.2 quantile is 20.8 percent as compared with
only 12.7 percent at the 0.8 quantile. The differences for men are more muted at 11.6 and
6.9 percent, respectively. These results show again that works councils have an impact on
wage compression in Germany.
The  wage  impact  of  works  councils  might  be  dependent  on  the  collective
bargaining regime. We therefore also interacted the works council dummy with our two
collective bargaining variables (at sector and firm level). The results are reported in
Appendix Table 3. From the second column of the table we find confirmation of Hübler
and Jirjahn’s (2003) result that works councils do have an independent impact on wages
in the order of 10.6 percent – but observe that the works council effect differs by type of
collective agreement. For establishments covered by sectoral collective bargaining the
works council effect is 10.3 percent, whereas for firm level bargaining the corresponding
premium is some 23.1 percent. This might be an indication that works councils indeed
use  their  bargaining  power  if  there  is  some  leeway  in  establishment-level  wage
bargaining. As a practical matter, however, given that there is a works council we
observe minor differences between wages in the two collective bargaining regimes.15
The impact of works councils on the wage structure can also be examined using
wage dispersion information aggregated at the establishment level. To this end, we
computed two straightforward measures of wage dispersion within establishments: the
standard deviation of individual wages and the coefficient of variation (the standard
deviation divided by average individual wages). The bottom line is that there is again
evidence of works councils reducing wage dispersion (irrespective of the collective
bargaining regime). However, the reductions in the standard deviation and the coefficient
of variation of wages in works council establishments are only in the order of -0.8 and -
0.02, respectively. Full results of this exercise are available from the authors on request.
 (Table 6 near here)
Finally, we tackle the important issue of whether higher tenure is a consequence
of rent-seeking or efficiency wages. We estimate the tenure model given by equations (5)
and (6). The results are reported in Table 6. If works councils imply higher wages,
workers in establishments with works councils will ceteris paribus tend to have greater
tenure. The results in the first column of the table confirm this: the coefficient estimate
for the works council term is positive and statistically significant, indicating that workers
in establishments with works councils do indeed have higher job tenure. On average,
workers covered by works councils have 1.6 years of additional tenure. Observe that
since the estimated model contains one dummy for each year of age, we are strictly
comparing individuals of the same age. The works council effect on tenure of male and
female workers is virtually the same.
The tenure regression in the first column of Table 6 does not include a direct
control for wages. A strong and enduring finding in the literature is that the higher are
earnings, the lower is turnover and thence (abstracting from the issue of the effect of
tenure on earnings) the higher is tenure (Farber, 1994). In order to isolate the effect of
works councils on tenure and address directly the wage impact on tenure, we follow the
approach by Card and de la Rica (2006), which as we have seen involves first identifying
the wage profile in other than works council establishments and then interacting the
predicted wages obtained from this regression with the works council dummy. The logic
behind this approach is that if the wage premium is a compensating differential – or a
return to unmeasured quality differences between workers – it should not necessarily
influence job tenure. The results of this exercise are reported in the second column of
Table 6. For the entire sample, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is positive
and statistically significant, indicating that the tenure gap is increasing in (expected)
wages. The size of this effect is nevertheless rather small: wages have almost to double to
generate an additional year of tenure. This result suggests that while works councils16
increase wages (and tenure) of all workers, the major implication seems to be a more
compressed wage structure, which is then translated into a relatively small tenure gap
over the distribution of wages/skills. As is readily apparent from the results in the last two
columns of Table 6, the results carry over to male workers, but for females the coefficient
estimate for the interaction term is both smaller and statistically insignificant.
(Table 6A here)
To further comment on the profile of job tenure in connection with works
councils, we next present in Table 6A the results from a quantile regression on tenure
model (6). The goal, it will be recalled, is to test whether works councils have a
higher/lower impact at higher reaches of the tenure distribution. Column (1) of this table
confirms the OLS results reported earlier in column (1) of Table 6, namely, that works
councils are associated with higher tenure. The works council effect is roughly constant
across the four selected tenure quantiles at around one to one and one-half years extra
tenure. Since column (1) ignores the role of wages, the more interesting case is given by
the specification in column (2) which contains the wage variable in interaction with the
works council dummy. After taking the wage variable into account, there is evidence that
works councils do generate longer tenure. Moreover, the gap is increasing at higher
reaches of the tenure distribution; specifically, it is three years for the top 0.8 quantile and
less than one year for the 0.4 quantile (and is even negative for the bottom 0.2 quantile).
On this implementation, then, the suggestion is that rent-seeking might be nontrivial
when a works council is present.
At  this  stage  it  is  also  worthwhile  attempting  to  disentangle  the  relative
importance of wages versus works council regime on the tenure profiles of individuals
through a different route also suggested in section III. The question is again whether the
observed  longer  tenure  in  works  council  plants  results  from  the  greater
attractiveness/efficiency of workplaces with works councils or rather reflects the outcome
of a rent-seeking process (respectively, the ‘voice’ versus ‘monopoly’ union arguments
adapted to the institution of the works council). We carry out this test by implementing
the Freeman-Medoff tenure model described in equation (7). It will be recalled that the
two effects –voice and monopoly – are assumed to be captured simply by looking at the
corresponding elasticity.
 (Table 7 near here)
The results are given in Table 7. As in equations (5) and (6) above, this approach
assumes away the simultaneity bias arising from the possibility that wages increase with
tenure and also the possibility that innately more stable individuals might select into
works council establishments (Freeman, 1980, claims that both biases are of a second17
order  of  magnitude).  The  apparent  outcome,  here  as  elsewhere,  is  that  the
voice/efficiency argument dominates the monopoly argument: the presence of a works
council implies a 40 percent increase in job tenure, while roughly a 70 percent increase in
wages would be required to obtain an equivalent percentage increase in job tenure.
Interestingly, these numbers are of much the same order of magnitude as those reported
by Freeman and Medoff (1984, Table 6-2) for unions in the United States.
All the above results pertain to our full sample of establishments. As a robustness
check on our results, we finally offer some corresponding evidence for a sub-sample of
establishments employing 21-100 employees. This sub-sample is more homogeneous for
the two reasons noted earlier: first, works council powers are virtually a datum within this
size class interval, whereas they are more generally increasing in employment; second,
the distribution of establishments with and without works councils is more even (works
council density is otherwise sharply increasing in establishment size). The sub-sample
contains many fewer individuals (some 100,000 workers in 3,000 establishments). The
descriptive statistics are contained in Appendix Table 4(a), from which it can again be
seen that average (log) wages and job tenure are higher in works council establishments.
Further,  employees’  qualifications  and  age  are  also  slightly  higher  in  these
establishments. Finally, plants with works councils are less prone to report high profits,
use modern technical equipment, or pay overtime supplements.
The material in Appendix Tables 4(b) through 4(e) makes clear that there is a
clear reduction in the works council premium in the sub-sample of establishments
employing 21 to 100 employees.
13 At the risk of some over-simplification, the wage
effect of works councils is reduced by 30 to 50 percent in comparison with the results for
the entire sample. This provides evidence that establishment size matters. Works councils
are again more favorable to women than men, but the role of councils in reducing wage
dispersion is less evident. Indeed, differences in the works council coefficient estimates
in the quantile regressions are minimal, and are even increasing for males (see Appendix
Table 4(e)).
Finally, from Table 4(f), there is evidence that works councils significantly
increase job tenure in the restricted sample (by an extra 0.8 years) as in the full sample,
but no evidence that increased tenure comes about through via higher wages as the
interaction term (predicted wages*works council) is never statistically significant. The
results from the Freeman-Medoff model suggest in turn that the voice argument is less
important for this employment size interval than for other establishments: the works
council dummy is clearly smaller while the wage impact on tenure is comparable (see18
Appendix Table 4(g) and compare with Table 7). This result is not altogether unexpected
because the voice shortfall is less compelling in smaller establishments.
VI.  Conclusions 
This paper has looked at the works council impact on the anatomy of wages in Germany.
It has demonstrated that the positive impact of the entity on wages is higher than that of
collective bargaining proper either at sectoral or firm level. Works councils are, then,
associated with a wage premium despite the fact that they are formally enjoined not to
engage in wage bargaining. To our knowledge, this is the first occasion on which this
result has been reported for matched-employer-employee data, although it has been
observed before in establishment panel data sets using information on average earnings.
But note that in the present treatment we were better able to control for unobserved
worker and establishment heterogeneity while still accounting for the selection of plants
into works council status.
Another potentially important result, generated from our quantile regressions, was
that the wage effect tends to be greatest lower down in the earnings distribution,
analogous to results reported for formal collective bargaining (even if this result either
did not obtain or was muted for smaller establishments.) Seemingly, works councils
reduce the standard deviation of wages and the coefficient of variation of wages in a
manner comparable to collective bargaining. In contrast to the literature on collective
wage agreements, however, we found that women profit more from the presence of
works councils than do men and that, accordingly, works councils attenuate the gender
wage gap.
Wage  compression  is  higher  in  Germany  than  in  most  other  industrialized
countries (Fitzenberger, 1999), and is associated with high and persistent unemployment
that mainly affects lower-skilled employees and those who previously worked in jobs at
the bottom end of the wage distribution (Siebert, 1997). Although there are many
different explanations for why wages in Germany are so compressed (and remain so), few
if any of them seem to be convincing (Muysken and Zwick, 2006). Again, subject to the
caveat provided by our results for the restricted firm sample, the institution of works
councils therefore provides an additional potential explanation that has heretofore
received scant attention.
Finally, we also investigated whether the longer tenure of employees in works
councils  establishments  reflected  higher  wages,  signaling  rent  extraction,  or
compensating differentials. Once we interacted predicted wages from an equation
describing wages of employees in establishments without works councils with the works19
council dummy, we found that only a small part of the higher wages seem to indicate rent
seeking. This finding was confirmed by comparing the direct effect of wages and works
councils on tenure using the Freeman-Medoff (1984) approach. Consistent with the wider
German literature, however, there were few indications of beneficial voice emanating
from works councils in smaller establishments.20
Endnotes
1 Although we should note that since 1990 firm-specific agreements have become more
common in Germany (see Hassel, 1999; Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003).
2  Recently,  sectoral  collective  agreements  have  made  explicit  allowance  for  local
bargaining through opening (and hardship) clauses – first in respect of working time and
then for wages and salaries – although the bargaining parties at sectoral level retain the
right to veto such agreements negotiated at plant level between the firm and the works
council.
3 Rather, the wage relation observed is between union density and wages and even here
the link is indirect.
4 Earlier research looking into the wage gap either reports no works council effect or even
a negative influence (see, respectively, Meyer 1995b; Bellman and Kohaut, 1995).
5 The authors use two works council variables, the second identifying situations in which
works councils are reportedly not involved in determining the wage gap. The omitted
category is absence of a works council of any form.
6 Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) argue that it is in the interests of both the employer side at
industry/regional level and the union to prevent works councils from rent seeking.
7 The current position is that around 49 percent of establishments in western Germany are
covered by sectoral collective agreements that apply to some 65 percent of employees.
8 For example, assuming  i i i a e ε + =  and  i a j a i i a F X a ′ + + = µ φ 1 , it follows from equation
(1) that  ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 i i a j j a i i a F B Z B X y ε µ δ φ + ′ + + + + + = . In this case, we can conclude
that both 
ols B 1 and 
ols δ from model (1) will be biased   as the corresponding measured
effects will include the biases  a φ and a µ , respectively (Card and de la Rica, 2006).
Similarly,  in  the  presence  of  an  establishment-specific  term,  we  would  have
i j i i v a e ε + + = ,  i a j a i i a F X a ′ + + = µ φ 1 ,  j v j v i j v F X v ' 1 + + = µ φ , and
  ) ' ' ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 i j i v a j j v a i i v a F B Z B X y ε µ µ δ φ φ + + + + + + + + + = .
9 A theoretical derivation of this model can be found in Freeman (1980, p. 649).
10  Given  that  n w w w n w w w n n / ) ln ... ln (ln ) / ) ... ln(( 2 1 2 1 + + + ≥ + + + ,  the
corresponding daily (arithmetic) average wage is at least 98.592, 62.240, 100.384, and
78.965 Euros, respectively.
11 The other skill levels are evenly distributed across works council and non-works
council establishments.21
12 Interquantile regression comparisons show that the presence of works councils has a
significant impact on the differences between the first and fifth as well as between the
fifth and ninth quantiles for women and men. The differences in coefficients [with t-
values in brackets] for men (women) are: -0.02 [15.05](-0.07 [27.93]) for the difference
between the first and fifth quantile and -0.04 [18.47] (-0.05 [19.12]) for the difference
between the fifth and ninth quantile.
13 Compare Appendix Table 4(b) with Table 2, Appendix Table 4(c) with Table 3,
Appendix Table 4(d) with Table 4, or Appendix Table 4(e) with Table 5. Full results are
available from the authors on request.22
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Fraction female 0.28 0.27 0.34
Fraction in western Germany 0.79 0.82 0.54 0.83 0.70
Fraction foreign 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.06
Distribution by skill level:
    Unskilled blue collar
    Low skilled blue collar
    Highly skilled blue collar
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High profits 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.26
Modern technical equipment 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.75
Overtime supplement 22.58 22.69 21.25 25.31 15.58
Export 0.43 0.44 0.29 0.48 0.29
Fraction covered by works
councils
0.90 0.91 0.88
Number of observations 1,344,656 1,171,597 130,811 966,762 377,894
Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1. Standard deviations are in
parenthesis
Source: LIAB Wave 2001.2627
Table 2: The Determinants of (Log) Wages, All Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Works council 0.460 (0.019) 0.132 (0.011) 0.111 (0.010) 0.114   (0.010)
Worker characteristics:
    Gender (female) -0.204 (0.005) -0.183 (0.003) -0.182   (0.003)
    Tenure (in years) 0.014  (0.001) 0.014 (0.001) 0.014 (0.000)
    Tenure
2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.000   0.000) -0.000   (0.000)
    Age 0.031 (0.001) 0.031 (0.001) 0.031    (0.001)
    Age
2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.000   0.000) -0.000   (0.000)
    Seceduc2 0.058   (0.006) 0.058   (0.005) 0.057    (0.005)
    Terteduc1 0.048   (0.020) 0.033   (0.019) 0.032  (0.020)
    Terteduc2 0.131   (0.008) 0.127   (0.007) 0.124   (0.007)
    Polytechnic 0.276   (0.008) 0.272   (0.008) 0.270 (0.007)
    University 0.420   (0.011) 0.413   (0.011) 0.411 (0.011)
    Unskilled blue collar -0.067 (0.007) -0.073 (0.005) -0.075  (0.005)
    Highly skilled blue collar 0.276 (0.009) 0.258 (0.008) 0.259   (0.008)
    White collar 0.276 (0.006) 0.234 (0.005) 0.236   (0.005)
    Foreigner -0.006 (0.004) -0.010   0.004 -0.013   0.0041
Establishment characteristics:
    western Germany 0.231 (0.008) 0.195     0.008 0.192 0.008
    size20_99 0.036 (0.153) 0.028 (0.014) 0.027   (0.014)
    size100_249 0.049 (0.017) 0.041 (0.016) 0.038   (0.016)
    size250_499 0.072 (0.018) 0.065 (0.017) 0.061 (0.017)
    size500_999 0.112 (0.018) 0.104 (0.017) 0.098 (0.017)
    size1000 0.159 (0.019) 0.145 (0.018) 0.111   (0.018)
 Collective agreement:
    at sector level







Payment above coll. agreement 0.027 (0.008) 0.025 (0.007) 0.025 (0.007)
High profits 0.014 (0.008) 0.017 (0.008) 0.021 (0.007)
Modern technical equipment 0.008 (0.008) 0.002 (0.008) -0.001 0.008
Overtime supplement 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Export -0.002 (0. 012) -0.003 (0.011) 0.005 (0.009)
Establishment-average worker
characteristics:
 Average female -0.233 (0.026) -0.225   (0.025)
 Average age 0.001 (0.001) -0.000   (0.001)
 Average unskilled blue collar -0.772 (0.063) -0.801   (0.068)
 Average low skilled blue collar -0.842  (0.064) -0.892   (0.069)
 Average highly skilled b-collar -0.606 (0.092) -0.706   (0.111)
 Average white collar -0.575 (0.063) -0.609   (0.068)
 Average foreigners 0.069 (0.043) 0.031 (0.038)
Propensity score 0.002   (0.0005)
R
2 0.11 0.61 0.62 0.63
F 612.03 999.16 1,317.51 1,345.75
N 1,293,969 1,269,599 1,269,599 1,248,506
Number of establishments 8,197 8,178 8,178 8,131
Notes: Dependent variable: log wages. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at
the establishment level and are heterogeneity robust. Model specifications are given by equations (1)
through (3) in the text. The model includes industry dummies in addition to the arguments shown in the
table.28
Table 3: The Determinants of Log Wages by Gender
Males Females
Works council 0.088 (0.010) 0.153 (0.014)
Worker characteristics:
   Tenure (in years) 0.014 (0.0001) 0.015 (0.001)
   Age 0.028 (0.001) 0.036 (0.002)
   Age
2 -0.0003 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
   Seceduc2 0.056 (0.005) 0.057 (0.008)
   Terteduc1 0.062 (0.017) -0.019 (0.031)
   Terteduc2 0.123 (0.008) 0.128 (0.009)
   Polytechnic 0.267 (0.008) 0.260 (0.011)
   University 0.410 (0.010) 0.431 (0.014)
   Unskilled blue collar -0.077 (0.005) -0.079 (0.008)
   Highly skilled blue collar 0.260 (0.008) 0.259 (0.020)
   White collar 0.253 (0.005) 0.187 (0.008)
   Foreigner -0.014  (0.005) -0.008 ( 0.004)
Establishment characteristics:
   western Germany 0.231 (0.008) 0.144 (0.009)
   size20_99 0.027 (0.008) 0.018 (0.031)
   size100_249 0.037 (0.011) 0.033 (0.031)
 size250_499 0.059 (0.012) 0.058 (0.033)
 size500_999 0.092 (0.013) 0.100 (0.032)








Payment above collective agreement 0.020 (0.008) 0.024 (0.010)
High profits 0.024 (0.007) 0.016 (0.010)
Modern technical equipment 0.009 (0.007) -0.015 (0.010)
Overtime supplement 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Export -0.004 (0.008) 0.023 (0.012)
Establishment-average worker characteristics:
   Average female -0.211 (0.234) -0.219 (0.031)
   Average age -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002)
   Average unskilled blue collar -0.781 (0.065) -0.907 (0.161)
   Average low skilled blue collar -0.857 (0.065) -1.034 (0.163)
   Average highly skilled blue collar -0.609 (0.108) -0.889 (0.184)
   Average white collar -0.614 (0.065) -0.670 (0.160)
Average foreigners -0.211 (0.024) -0.022 (0.085)





Number of establishments 7,581 7,399
Note: see Notes to Table 2.29
Table 4: The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level
Seceduc1 Seceduc2 Terteduc1 Terteduc2
Works council 0.112 (0.021) 0.123 (0.012) 0.195 (0.093) 0.055 (0.015)
Worker characteristics:
    Gender (female) -0.133 (0.001) -0.185(0.003) -0.167 (0.012) -0.139 (0.005)
Tenure (in years) 0.011 (0.001) 0.011(0.001) 0.024 (0.003) 0.009 (0.001)
    Tenure
2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
    Age 0.026 (0.002) 0.261 (0.001) 0.103 (0.008) 0.068 (0.002)
    Age
2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
    Unskilled blue collar -0.065 (0.007) -0.072 (0.005) -0.013 (0.027) -0.065 (0.012)
    Highly skilled blue collar 0.263 (0.035) 0.269 (0.008) 0.164 (0.057) 0.234 (0.012)
    White collar 0.149 (0.013) 0.228 (0.004) 0.333 (0.025) 0.290 (0.009)
    Foreigner 0.008 (0.004) -0.009 (0.003) -0.046 (0.022) -0.021 (0.009)
Establishment characteristics:
   western Germany 0.178  (0.019) 0.187 (0.008) 0.090 (0.049) 0.174 (0.011)
   size20_99 -0.010 (0.019) 0.039 (0.008) 0.025 (0.079) 0.097 (0.025)
   size100_249 -0.024 (0.022) 0.052 (0.011) -0.020 (0.096) 0.121 (0.026)
 size250_499 0.057 (0.025) 0.070(0.014) 0.019 (0.116) 0.141 (0.027)
 size500_999 0.093 (0.024) 0.110 (0.014) 0.054 (0.103) 0.167 (0.026)
   size1000 0.105 (0.025) 0.123 (0.015) 0.086 (0.109) 0.190 (0.028)
Collective agreement:
 at sector level











0.005 (0.010) 0.024 (0.008) -0.006 (0.023) 0.035 (0.009)
High profits 0.038 (0.010) 0.024 (0.008) -0.010 (0.025) 0.019 (0.010)
Modern technical equipment 0.022 (0.010) -0.005 (0.008) 0.062 (0.033) -0.015 (0.011)
Overtime supplement 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Export -0.027 (0.010) 0.006 (0.009) 0.013 (0.038) 0.006 (0.013)
Establishment-average worker
characteristics:
  Average female -0.296 (0.031) -0.225 (0.023) -0.247 (0.092) -0.140 (0.031)
  Average age 0.006 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.005 (0.005) -0.001 (0.002)
  Average unskilled blue collar -5.684 (7.300) -0.570 (0.313) -4.848
(15.278)
-0.430 (0.305)
  Average low skilled blue
collar
-5.770 (7.301) -0.663 (0.313) -4.848(15.276) -0.520 (0.306)
  Average highly skilled blue
collar
-5.935 (7.301) -0.423 (0.324) -4.909(15.278) -0.136 (0.319)
  Average white collar -5.555 (7.300) -0.381 (0.312) -4.617(15.276) -0.244 (0.305)
  Average foreigners 0.044 (0.037) 0.068 (0.036) 0.367 (0.156) 0.211 (0.063)
Propensity score 0.002 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000) 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.000)
R
2 0.54 0.60 0.51 0.51
F 176.8 798.79 62.98 356.87
N 167,520 796,984 9,915 63,873
Number of establishments 4,221 7,719 1,632 3,723
Note: see Table 2.30
Table 4 (cont.): The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level
Polytechnic University
Works council 0.115 (0.015) 0.087 (0.025)
Worker characteristics:
    Gender (female) -0.150   (0.005) -0.123 (0.004)
Tenure (in years) 0.013 (0.001) 0.020 (0.001)
    Tenure
2 -0.000  (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
    Age 0.053 (0.002) 0.055 (0.003)
    Age
2 -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000)
    Unskilled blue collar -0.106 (0.025) -0.174 (0.027)
    Highly skilled blue collar 0.276 (0.020) 0.401 (0.036)
    White collar 0.423 (0.015) 0.551 (0.019)
    Foreigner -0.023 (0.010) -0.071 (0.007)
Establishment characteristics:
  western Germany 0.275 (0.012) 0.234 (0.011)
  size20-99 -0.064 (0.026) 0.022 (0.045)
  size100-249 -0.087 (0.027) 0.061 (0.046)
size250_499 0.112 (0.028) 0.103 (0.047)
size500_999 0.127 (0.028) 0.136 (0.047)
  size1000 0.121 (0.028) 0.150 (0.047)
Collective agreement:
 at sector level





Payment above collective agreement 0.027 (0.010) 0.032 (0.010)
High profits 0.009 (0.007) 0.014 (0.008)
Modern technical equipment 0.023 (0.009) 0.016 (0.009)
Overtime supplement 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Export 0.010 (0.009) 0.015 (0.011)
Establishment-average worker characteristics:
   Average female -0.141 (0.030) -0.062 (0.031)
   Average age -0.004 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002)
   Average unskilled blue collar 0.515  (0.732) -0.516 (0.322)
   Average low skilled blue collar 0.500 (0.732) -0.608 (0.322)
   Average highly skilled blue collar 0.707  (0.738) -0.431 (0.355)
   Average white collar 0.653 (0.731) -0.366 (0.323)
   Average foreigners 0.223 (0.051) 0.216 (0.062)





Number of establishments 3,499 3,554
Note: See Notes to Table 2.31
Table 5: Quantile (Log) Wage Regressions by Works Council Coverage and Gender
Quantiles
0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Complete Sample:
Works council






































































Notes: Dependent variable: log wages. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model specifications are given
by equations (1) through (3) in the text. The mode uses the covariates shown in column (4) of Table 2.32
Table 6: The Determinants of Tenure
All workers Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works council 1.566 (0.230) -2.873 (1.903) 1.538 (0.270) -3.101 (2.244) 1.519 (0.245) 0.037 (2.209)
Predicted (log)
wage*works council
- 1.064 (0.453) - 1.086 (0.526) - 0.372 (0.561)
Worker
characteristics:
  Gender (female) -0.521 (0.101) -0.251 (0.135)
  Seceduc2 -0.233   (0.203) -0.242  (0.203) -0.163 (0.237) -0.169 (0.236) -0.794   (0.181) -0.799 (0.182)
  Terteduc1 -2.927   (0.326) -2.771  (0.330) -3.232  (0.390) -3.063    (0.399) -2.607   (0.249) -2.557 (0.258)
  Terteduc2 -2.387   (0.394) -2.521  (0.403) -2.615  (0.519) -2.748   (0.527) -2.539   (0.239) -2.588 (0.253)
  Polytechnic -3.440   (0.315) -3.676  (0.346) -3.606  (0.353) -3.840 (0.386) -3.194   (0.267) -3.272 (0.293)
  University -4.136   (0.375) -4.516   (0.435) -4.319  (0.418) -4.698 (0.490) -3.784   (0.323) -3.915 (0.373)
  Unskilled b-c -1.240 (0.098) -1.125 (0.285) -1.175 (0.323) -1.056 (0.312) -0.811 (0.224) -0.765 (0.219)
  Highly skilled b-c 1.200  (0.512) 0.910 (0.498) 1.014 (0.488) 0.716 (0.485) 2.000 (0.495) 1.924 (0.502)
  White collar 0.022 (0.210) -0.249 (0.241) -0.084 (0.226) -0.371 (0.253) 0.764 (0.196) 0.684 (0.238)
  Foreigner -0.322  (0.193) -0.280   (0.193) -0.332   (0.215) -0.290  (0.215) -0.395   (0.209) -0.379 (0.209)
Establishment
characteristics:
  western Germany 3.881  (0.269) 3.620   (0.257) 4.182  (0.327) 3.919 (0.324) 3.112 (0.219) 3.019 (0.222)
  size20_99 -0.605 (0.304) -0.587 (0.309) -0.212 (0.235) -0.174 (0.236) -1.078 (0.360) -1.090 (0.363)
  size100_249 -0.583 (0.359) -0.592 (0.364) -0.172 (0.321) -0.150 (0.322) -1.001 (0.396) -1.027 (0.400)
  size250_499 -0.254 (0.377) -0.243 (0.382) 0.167 (0.354) 0.212 (0.354) -0.764 (0.407) -0.783 (0.411)
  size500_999 0.258 (0.404) 0.185 (0.411) 0.699 (0.394) 0.655 (0.401) -0.314 (0.419) -0.361 (0.430)
  size1000 1.664 (0.550) 1.547 (0.545) 2.450 (0.583) 2.361 (0.401) 0.172 (0.493) 0.111 (0.430)
  High profits 0.411 (0.409) 0.388 (0.410) 0.625 (0.454) 0.604 (0.455) -0.264 (0.317) -0.273 (0.316)
  Modern tech equip. -0.508 (0.415) -0.557 (0.411) -0.711 (0.471) -0.760 (0.465) 0.080 (0.323) 0.062 (0.319)
  Overtime suppl. -0.001 (0.008) -0.001 (0.008) -0.002 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008) 0.001 (0.008) 0.001 (0.007)
  Export -0.895 (0.655) -0.949 (0.653) -1.007 (0.692) -1.007 (0.692) -0.295 (0.510) -0.311 (0.509)
 Coll. agreement:
   at sector level















0.197 (0.583) 0.134 (0.585) 0.345 (0.709) 0.300 (0.763) -0.200 (0.338) -0.226 (0.338)
R
2 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.30
F 77.75 81.33 64.78 68.90 66.42 67.35
N 1,277,903 1,277,903 916,584 916,584 361,319 361,319
Number of
establishments
8,182 8,182 7,621 7,621 7,455 7,455
Notes: Model specifications are given by equations (4) and (5) in the text. Dependent variable: tenure
in years. Standard errors (clustered by establishment and heterogeneity robust) are in parentheses. The
model  includes  industry  dummies.  Dummies  for  each  year  of  age  were  also  included  in  the
specification.33
Table 6A: The Determinants of Tenure; Quantile Regressions (All Workers)
Quantile
Works council
(Model without interaction term)
Interaction term
(Model with works council variable and
interaction term )
0.2 1.28 (0.013) -0.84 (0.024)
0.4 1.56 (0.029) 0.60 (0.059)
0.6 1.32 (0.029) 2.64 (0.066)
0.8 1.02 (0.029) 2.98 (0.073)
Note: See Table 6.
Table 7: The Determinants of Tenure: The Freeman/Medoff Tenure Model (All Workers)
Coefficient (s.e.)
(log) Wage 0.645 (0.029)
Works council 0.384 (0.044)
Worker characteristics:
Gender (female) 0.193 (0.015)
Age 0.045 (0.001)
Unskilled blue collar -0.172 (0.034)
Highly skilled blue collar -0.093 (0.045)
White collar -0.454 (0.027)
Foreigner -0.100 (0.026)
Establishment characteristics:







 at  sector level
 at establishment level
0.112 (0.041)
0.133 (0.073)
Payment above collective agreement -0.032 (0.068)
High profits 0.023 (0.047)
Modern technical equipment -0.046 (0.049)






Number of establishments 8,178
Notes: Dependent variable: (log) tenure in years. OLS regressions, standard errors (clustered by
establishment and heterogeneity robust) are in parentheses. The model includes industry dummies.34
 Appendix Table 1: Description of Variables
Variable Definition
(a)
Wages Daily (log) gross wage (in DM). Information on wages in the administrative data
is right censored at the upper earnings limit for social security contributions. For
such individuals, the predicted wage was obtained using separate Tobit
regressions of the daily wage on tenure, tenure square, skill category, plant
location (western vs. eastern Germany) and industry dummies. These separate
Tobit regressions were defined according to gender, education level, and
nationality, in a total of 20 different cells.
Gender Dummy: 1 if worker is female, 0 otherwise.
Tenure Job tenure at the current establishment (in years).
Number of days since beginning work at the current establishment.
Employee skill
groups
Employees in the raw administrative records were classified into four groups:
three blue-collar worker categories (comprising the unskilled, low skilled, and
highly skilled) and one aggregate white-collar category made up of all white-
collar grades. The residual categories of home-workers, part-time workers, and
apprentices were dropped from the sample.




Employees in the raw administrative records were classified into six categories
according to their education level: Seceduc1 (individuals without a completed
apprenticeship and without an Abitur), Seceduc2 (individuals with a completed
apprenticeship and without an Abitur), Terteduc1 (individuals without a
completed apprenticeship and with an Abitur), Terteduc2 (individuals with a
completed apprenticeship and with an Abitur), Polytechnic (individuals with a
Polytechnic degree), and University (individuals with an University degree).
(b)
Works council Dummy: 1 if works council is present, 0 otherwise.
Western
Germany
Dummy: 1 if the establishment is in western Germany, 0 otherwise.













Modern technology dummy: 1 if the plant’s equipment is either state-of-the art or
up-to-date compared with other firms in the same industry, 0 otherwise.
Overtime
supplement
Share of employees who receive paid overtime hours.
Export Dummy: 1 if the percentage share of exports in the establishment’s annual
turnover is greater than zero, 0 otherwise.
Size20_99 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 19 and 99, 0 otherwise.
Size100_249 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 99 and 250, 0 otherwise.
Size250_499 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 249 and 500, 0 otherwise.
Size500_999 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 499 and 1,000, 0 otherwise.
Size1000 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is greater than 999, 0 otherwise.
Notes: Variables in panel (a) were extracted from the Employment Statistics Register, while those in panel
(b) were taken from the IAB Employer Survey. See text, section IV.35










































Fraction female 0.37 0.35 0.38
Fraction in western Germany 0.62 0.69 0.56 0.62 0.61
Fraction foreign 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
Distribution by skill level:
    Unskilled blue collar
    Low skilled blue collar
    Highly skilled blue collar
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    at sector level











High profits 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.25
Modern technical equipment 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.70
Overtime supplement 17.10 17.9 16.38 20.32 11.48
Export 0.23 0.32 0.16 0.28 0.16
Fraction covered by works
councils
0.44 0.45 0.42
Number of observations 8,579 3,589 4,612 5,451 3,128
 Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1. Standard deviations are in
parenthesis.
Source: LIAB Wave 2001.36
Appendix Table 3: The Determinants of (Log) Wages, Including Interaction Terms
between Works Councils and Selected Covariates
Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.)
Works council 0.055 (0.016) 0.106 (0.015)
Works council * Collective agreement (sector level) -0.008 (0.018)
Works council * Collective agreement (estab. level) 0.113 (0.028)
Worker characteristics:
Gender (female) -0.270 (0.010) -0.182 (0.003)
Tenure (in years) 0.014 (0.001) 0.014 (0.001)
Tenure
2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.0003 (0.00001)
Age 0.031 (0.001) 0.031 (0.001)
Age
2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.0003 (0.00001)
Seceduc2 0.028 (0.014) 0.057 (0.005)
Terteduc1 -0.171 (0.144) 0.03 (0.02)
Terteduc2 0.175 (0.016) 0.125 (0.007)
Polytechnic 0.238 (0.017) 0.270 (0.008)
University 0.372 (0.023) 0.411 (0.011)
Works council * Gender 0.098 (0.011)
Works council * Seceduc2 0.035 (0.015)
Works council * Terteduc1 0.221 (0.145)
Works council * Terteduc2 -0.051 (0.017)
Works council * Polytechnic 0.038 (0.017)
Works council * University 0.045 (0.023)
Unskilled blue collar -0.074 (0.004) -0.075 (0.005)
Highly skilled blue collar 0.258 (0.008) 0.259 (0.008)
White collar 0.236 (0.005) 0.236 (0.0048)
 Foreigner -0.012 (0.004) -0.013 (0.004)
Establishment characteristics:
western Germany 0.194 (0.008) 0.191 (0.008)
size20_99 0.025 (0.015) 0.029 (0.014)
size100_249 0.037 (0.016) 0.042 (0.016)
size250_499 0.061 (0.017) 0.066 (0.017)
size500_999 0.097 (0.017) 0.101 (0.017)
Size1000 0.111 (0.018) 0.115 (0.018)
Collective agreement
  at sector level





Payment above collective agreement 0.025 (0.007) 0.026 (0.007)
High profits 0.021 (0.007) 0.021 (0.007)
Modern technical equipment -0.001 (0.008) -0.0006 (0.007)
Overtime supplement 0.001 (0.000) 0.0008 (0.0001)
Export 0.005 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009)
Establishment-average worker characteristics:
Average female -0.211 (0.026) -0.225 (0.025)
Average age 0.000 (0.001) 0.0002 (0.001)
Average unskilled blue collar -0.807 (0.068) -0.802 (0.069)
Average low skilled blue collar -0.896 (0.069) -0.892 (0.070)
Average highly skilled blue collar -0.693 (0.111) -0.713 (0.111)
Average white collar -0.618 (0.068) -0.611 (0.069)
Average foreigners 0.033 (0.038) 0.0337 (0.038)





Number of establishments 8,131 8,131
Note:  See Table 2.38
Appendix Table 4(a): Descriptive Statistics, Establishments with 21-100 Employees,
(Individual Level)














Fraction female 0.314 0.308
Distribution by skill level:
   Unskilled blue collar 0.189 0.168
   Highly skilled blue collar 0.023 0.025
   White collar 0.445 0.500
   Foreigner 0.043 0.041
Collective agreement
   at sector level





Payment above collective agreement 0.356 0.403
western  Germany 0.570 0.611
High profits 0.284 0.238
Modern technical equipment 0.708 0.670
Overtime supplement 20.694 18.485
Export 0.278 0.287
Distribution by schooling level:
   Seceduc1 0.097 0.097
   Seceduc2 0.672 0.680
   Terteduc1 0.004 0.005
   Terteduc2 0.032 0.037
   Polytechnic 0.037 0.048
   University 0.055 0.075
Fraction covered by works councils 0.457
Appendix Table 4(b): The Determinants of (Log) Wages in Establishments with 21-100
Employees, Summary Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Works council 0.227 (0.014) 0.094 (0.009) 0.073 (0.009) 0.065 (0.009)
R
2 0.07 0.56 0.57 0.57
F 257.08 392.49 526.98 522.34
N 96,011 95,885 95,885 95,408
Number of establishments 2,754 2,751 2,751 2,737
Note: See Table 239
Appendix Table 4(c): The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Gender in
Establishments with 21-100 Employees, Summary Results
Males Females




N 65,756  29,652
Number of establishments 2,671 2,607
Note: See Table 2
Appendix Table 4(d): The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level in
Establishments with 21-100 Employees, Summary Results














2 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.49 0.36
F 74.75 374.90 13.17 54.86 50.32 36.30
N 9,204 64,268 434 3,131 3,601 5,284
Number of establishments 1,377 2,658 295 1,121 1,062 1,046
Notes: See Table 2
Appendix Table 4(e): Quantile (Log) Wage Regressions by Works Council Coverage and
Gender in Establishments with 21-100 Employees, Summary Results
Quantiles
0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Complete Sample:
Works council 0.056 (0.002) 0.059 (0.002) 0.062 (0.002) 0.060 (0.003)
Males:
Works council 0.044 (0.003) 0.048 (0.002) 0.051 (0.003) 0.052 (0.003)
Females:
Works council 0.107 (0.005) 0.095 (0.005) 0.093 (0.004) 0.083 (0.005)
Note:  See Table 5.
Appendix Table 4(f): The Determinants of Tenure [Card and de la Rica Model] in
Establishments with 21-100 Employees, Summary Results
All Males Females






















2 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.21
F 52.08 52.08 39.40 39.49 41.23 40.72
N 96,524 96,524 66,307 66,607 30,217 30,217
Number of establishments 2,751 2,751 2,684 2,684 2,623 2,623
Note: See Table 6.40
Appendix Table 4(g): Determinants of Tenure [Freeman/Medoff  Tenure Model] in
Establishments with 21-100 Employees, Summary Results
Coefficient (s.e.)
(log) Wages 0.710 (0.034)
Works council 0.144 (0.032)





Number of establishments 2,848
Note: See Table 7.